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We show that three principle means of treating privacy amplification in quantum key distribu-
tion, private state distillation, classical privacy amplification, and via the uncertainty principle, are
equivalent and interchangeable. By adapting the security proof based on the uncertainty principle,
we construct a new protocol for private state distillation which we prove is identical to standard
classical privacy amplification. Underlying this approach is a new characterization of private states,
related to their standard formulation by the uncertainty principle, which gives a more physical
understanding of security in quantum key distribution.
Privacy amplification is the art of extracting a secret
key from a string which is partially-known to an eaves-
dropper [1, 2]. In quantum key distribution (QKD) it
plays a vital role as the protagonists, Alice and Bob,
would like to transform their shared, but not secret, raw
key into a verifiably secret key even when the eavesdrop-
per Eve has tampered with the quantum signals.
Heuristically, privacy amplification works by applying
a suitable randomly-chosen function to the raw key which
scrambles and shortens it so that Eve’s limited knowledge
of the input tells her nothing about the output. The
canonical example is using a random public string and
computing the XOR with the original string. Provided
Eve’s information is not too large, Alice and Bob can be
confident that the output will be secret.
Broadly speaking, QKD has historically taken three
main approaches to privacy amplification. Each is char-
acterized by its treatment of the states held by the var-
ious parties to the protocol. The first focuses on Eve’s
marginal state conditional on the key string, which she
obtains in the course of eavesdropping. Applying a ran-
dom function to the key string results in new marginal
states for Eve which are essentially identical. We term
this method classical privacy amplification as it is an
adaptation of privacy amplification against classical ad-
versaries. It can be traced through the sequence of pa-
pers [3, 4, 5, 6, 7].
The remaining two approaches focus either concretely
on the states held by Alice and Bob, including any aux-
iliary systems, or abstractly on the key itself. In the
former, privacy amplification is recast as a virtual form
of private state distillation in which Alice and Bob trans-
form their initial shared quantum state into a private
state, a state which yields secret keys upon measure-
ment [8]. Maximally entangled states are a subset of
private states, so this method includes the techniques of
applying entanglement distillation to privacy amplifica-
tion developed in [9, 10, 11] and the subsequent work
employing the technique of Shor and Preskill. Means for
distilling more general private states were found in [12].
The latter approach of focusing abstractly on the
key itself, irrespective of its realization by either honest
party and disregarding any auxiliary systems not held
by Eve, was employed in the first QKD security proof
by Mayers [13], subsequently improved by Koashi and
Preskill [14], and finally culminated in a security proof
based on the uncertainty principle by Koashi [15]. Here
privacy amplification is viewed as a means of creating a
virtual Pauli X eigenstate and then obtaining the key by
measuring the conjugate Z observable.
In this letter we draw these three threads together and
show they are equivalent when privacy amplification is
based on linear functions. We do so by adapting Koashi’s
proof to give a new method of private state distillation
and then prove it is identical to classical privacy am-
plification. The distillation technique follows from a new
characterization of private states which is complementary
to their standard description in the sense of the uncer-
tainty principle. This unifies various approaches to the
security of QKD, allowing the various means of treating
privacy amplification to be interchanged. Moreover, it
provides a more physical picture of how security arises
from quantum mechanics.
The new private state distillation method significantly
generalizes that presented in [12], which directly ap-
plied entanglement distillation techniques. Correction of
phase errors afflicting the key subsystems becomes eas-
ier for private states as the shield can store phase er-
ror information. Thus, not all phase errors need be cor-
rected, increasing the secret key yield above the entan-
glement yield. However, the resulting rates still do not
always match those of classical privacy amplification as
the shared state is not always a classical mixture of states
subjected to various phase errors.
Our results are presented as follows. We first show
how the uncertainty principle inspires dual descriptions
of private states. Then the method of classical privacy
amplification is shortly recounted before proceeding to
the new approach to private state distillation. The details
of the derivation of the secret key rate are presented from
which the equivalence of the methods follows. Finally, we
conclude with a view to open problems and related issues.
Secret Keys and Private States.—A perfect secret key
shared by Alice and Bob is a uniformly-distributed
2random variable about which Eve has zero informa-
tion. Thus a perfect secret bit is defined as κABE =(
1
2
∑1
k=0 P
k
A ⊗ P kB
)
⊗ ρE for any ρE , where P k = |k〉〈k|.
Private states are those quantum states for which in-
dependent measurements by Alice and Bob yield a secret
key. For secret bits, our focus in the remainder of the pa-
per, these measurements might as well be standard basis
measurements on the qubit key registers A and B. The
overall state can be purified by including additional sys-
tems, be they shield systems S under the control of Alice
and/or Bob or Eve’s systems E. A private state γABSE
is then a pure state of the form
1√
2
∑
k
|kk〉ABV kS |ξ〉SE = UABS |Φ〉AB|ξ〉SE , (1)
where the unitaries V k as well as the state |ξ〉 are arbi-
trary. The state |Φ〉 is the canonical maximally-entangled
state and the unitary UABS =
∑
j,k P
j,k
AB ⊗ V j,kS is called
a twisting operator.
The fact that private states lead to secret keys and
secret keys come from private states immediately fol-
lows (cf. Theorem 2 of [16]). Measurement of a pri-
vate state γABSE immediately yields κABE with ρE =
ξE . Conversely, suppose γABSE is a pure state yielding
κABE under the prescribed measurement. It follows that
|γ〉ABSE = 1√2
∑
k |kk〉AB|ϕk〉SE for some arbitrary nor-
malized states |ϕk〉 and furthermore, that ϕkE = ρE for
all k. Calling |ξ〉SE the purification of ρE , we must have
|ϕk〉SE = V kS |ξ〉SE for some unitaries V kS since all purifi-
cations of the same state are related by unitaries on the
purifying system. We have implicitly proven
Theorem 1. A pure state γABSE is a private state if
and only if (a) pj,k = Tr[γABSE P
j,k
AB] =
1
2 δj,k, and (b)
γjE = γ
k
E for all j, k.
This formulation is straightforward: Eve can obtain no
information about the key when all her marginal states
are identical. The approach of classical privacy amplifica-
tion is to prove the shared output state has this property.
A different characterization of private states follows
from considering a hypothetical measurement by Alice
in the x-basis. This produces conditional states of the
BS subsystem: σxBS = 2A〈x˜|γABS |x˜〉A, where |x˜〉 is the
xth x-basis state. Then one has
Theorem 2. A pure state γABSE is a private state if
and only if (a) pj,k = Tr[γABSE P
j,k
AB ] =
1
2 δj,k, and (b
′)
σjBS σ
k
BS = 0 for all j 6= k.
Proof. Suppose γABSE is a private state, for which con-
dition (a) is satisfied by inspection. The states BS condi-
tional states are σxBS = Z
x
BUBS
(
P
e0
B ⊗ ξS
)
U †BSZ
x
B, where
the unitary UBS=
∑
k P
k
B ⊗ V kS for P ex = |x˜〉〈x˜|, and
Zx is the xth power of Z, in contrast to all other up-
per indices appearing herein. Since [ZB, UBS]=0, σ
x
BS =
UBS
(
P exB ⊗ ξS
)
U †BS , and (b
′) follows immediately.
Conversely, by condition (a) we have |γ〉ABSE =
1√
2
∑
k |kk〉AB |ϕk〉SE . From the Schmidt decomposition
|ϕk〉SE =
∑
ℓ
√
λkℓ |µkℓ 〉S |νkℓ 〉E define Y kS=
√
ϕkSV
k
S for
unitary V k so that |ϕk〉SE =
∑
ℓ Y
k
S |ℓℓ〉SE. Here
V k=Lk(Rk)T using the unitaries Lk|ℓ〉=|µkℓ 〉 and
Rk|ℓ〉=|νkℓ 〉. Now we can write σxBS = ZxBσBSZxBS
for σBS =
1
2
∑
jk |j〉B〈k| ⊗ Y jS (Y kS )†. Condi-
tion (b′) then implies (Y 0)† Y 0 = (Y 1)† Y 1.
Defining |ξ〉SE=
√
(Y 0S )
† Y 0S
∑
ℓ |ℓ〉S |ℓ〉E we obtain
V kS |ξ〉SE=|ϕk〉SE and thus the operator UBS produces
the private state: |γ〉ABSE = UBS |Φ〉AB|ξ〉SE .
We can understand the relationship between these two
characterizations as an instance of the uncertainty prin-
ciple, which in entropic form requires that the sum of en-
tropies of x- and z-basis measurements must not be less
than unity [17]. Theorem 1 implies that Eve’s entropy of
Alice’s z-basis measurement (i.e. the key) is itself unity.
Complementarily, theorem 2 means Bob’s entropy (ac-
tually Bob and shield) of Alice’s x-basis measurement is
zero, so Eve’s entropy of z must be not less than unity.
Classical Privacy Amplification.—An ideal privacy am-
plification protocol would output a perfectly secret key
key from the input of only partially secret data. This is
too optimistic for practical applications however, and in
this section we recapitulate the formulation of protocols
which distill an approximately secret key. We say ρABE
is ǫ-private when ||ρABE − κABE||1 ≤ 2ǫ. This definition
ensures the key can be safely composed with any other
cryptographic task and moreover, we can interpret the
definition as saying that the actual key ρABE is really the
ideal key κABE with probability at least 1− ǫ [4, 18] [28].
Here we assume that the input to privacy amplifica-
tion is ψ⊗nABE , where ψABE =
1
2
∑
k P
k,k
AB⊗ϕkE describes a
shared but not necessarily secret bit. In QKD this prod-
uct state is the product of a collective attack in which
Eve tampers with each signal individually. More general
coherent attacks have been dealt with by randomly per-
muting the quantum signals after receipt and then show-
ing that privacy amplification can extract the same key
from the resulting state as from a product state [19, 20].
Now, for K the classical random variable held by Alice
and Bob, and I the quantum mutual information, one
can show
Theorem 3 ([4, 6]). There exists a privacy amplification
scheme to extract n[1 − I(K:E)] secret bits from ψ⊗nABE,
for n→∞. Moreover, this is the maximum possible rate.
The scheme in [6] works by selecting a function at ran-
dom and applying it to each of the A and B systems; the
output size of the function is n[1 − I(K:E)] bits. The
crux of that proof is a result on measure concentration,
3the generic term indicating when a random variable is ex-
ponentially likely to be very close to its mean value. The
random variable in this case is Eve’s state ϕkE , where
k ∈ {0, 1}n. Initially Eve’s conditional states are not
close to the mean, but averaging over some of the k pro-
duces a new random variable which is. This partial aver-
age comes from regarding the random function as picking
a random reversible function on the length-n strings and
then discarding (averaging over) the last nI(K:E) bits.
The privacy amplification function need not be com-
pletely random; as shown in [4] any 2-universal family
of hash functions suffice. This includes random linear
hashing, which we will use for private state distillation.
Private State Distillation.—As in classical privacy am-
plification, the goal of private state distillation is to dis-
till a state close to a private state, again measured by
the trace distance. Since the key measurement is itself a
quantum operation, an output state ǫ-close to a private
state results in a key at least ǫ-close to κABE .
Koashi’s method is to distill an X eigenstate in a single
abstract key register; its immediate application to private
states is obscured by the need to respect the form of the
twisting operator. But by using a linear hash function for
privacy amplification we can neatly avoid this problem.
The essential point remains that the honest parties have
full information about an observable conjugate to the key.
Initially Alice, Bob, and Eve share ψ⊗nABE , which can
be purified using the shield system S to the state
|Ψ〉ABSE = |ψ〉⊗nABSE =
1
2n
∑
k,x
|x˜〉AZxB|k〉B |ϕk〉SE . (2)
Generally, Bob cannot perfectly predict the outcome x′
of Alice’s hypothetical x-basis measurement since his in-
formation is limited by the Holevo quantity χ of the en-
semble E = { 12 , ρxBS}, where ρxBS = 2A〈x˜|ψABS |x˜〉A [21].
But then the distillation strategy suggests itself: have
Alice provide Bob the missing information. If she nar-
rows the possible ρxBS to a suitably-random set of size
2nχ(E), then the HSW theorem indicates that with high
probability Bob can determine x′ [22].
Having sketched the method roughly, we now turn to
the details. Alice’s announcement consists of the bits
hi = ui ·x′ for n[1−χ(E)] randomly chosen ui, i.e. a ran-
dom linear hash of x′. This can be thought of as the re-
sult of measuring the observablesXui, which define Pauli
X operators for a set of “encoded” qubits. The comple-
mentary subsystem of encoded qubits is associated with
the set of Zvj , where ui · vj = 0 for all i, j. Thus we can
decompose the space of Alice’s (Bob’s) physical qubit sys-
tems into virtual systems A1, A2 (B1, B2) corresponding
to the observables Zvj and Xui , respectively. The post-
announcement state is |Ψ′〉A1BSE = A2〈h˜|ZhB2 |Ψ〉ABSE,
|Ψ′〉A1BSE =
1
2nχ
∑
y,ℓ
|y˜〉A1ZyB1 |ℓ〉B1 |ϕ¯ℓ〉B2SE , (3)
where |ϕ¯ℓ〉B2SE = (2n(1−χ))−
1
2
∑
m |m〉B2 |ϕ(ℓ,m)〉SE ,
since Bob can apply ZhB2 after learning h from Alice.
He is left to distinguish the states ̺yBS = Z
y
B1
Ψ′BSZ
y
B1
.
Note that system B2 has now become part of the shield.
A slight modification of the HSW theorem ensures that
with high probability the pretty good measurement [23]
can distinguish the ̺yBS with arbitrarily small probabil-
ity of error. The theorem originally applies to the distin-
guishability of random subsets of ρxBS and here we have
a random subspace. However, in the Appendix we show
that the standard proof can be easily adapted to this
case, and in fact more generally to the use of 2-universal
hashing. Bob’s measurement has elements
EyBS =
√
T−1BS
(
ΠBS Π
y
BSΠBS
)√
T−1BS , (4)
for TBS =
∑
yΠBSΠ
y
BSΠBS , and Π
y
BS (ΠBS) the projec-
tion onto the typical subspace of ̺yBS (〈̺yBS〉), the sub-
space spanned by eigenvectors whose eigenvalues are near
the likely value. Here 〈·〉 denotes the average value.
We can determine the EyBS explicitly and thereby ob-
tain the twisting operator. Note that ZyB1̺
y
BSZ
y
B1
=
1
2nχ
∑
ℓ,ℓ′ |ℓ〉B1〈ℓ′| ⊗ TrE
[|ϕ¯ℓ〉B2SE〈ϕ¯ℓ′ |], meaning that
system B2S determines typicality in both ΠBS and Π
y
BS .
Following the proof of Theorem 2 we may then define
Y¯ ℓB2S so that ΠBSΠ
y
BSΠBS becomes
ZyB1
(∑
ℓ,ℓ′
|ℓ〉B1〈ℓ′| ⊗ Y¯ ℓB2S Y¯ ℓ
′†
B2S
)
ZyB1 . (5)
Direct calculation gives TBS = 2
nχ
∑
ℓ P
ℓ
B1
⊗ Y¯ ℓB2S Y¯
ℓ†
B2S
and the square root of the (pseudo) inverse follows.
Now consider the unitary V¯ ℓ which comes from the
polar decomposition Y¯ ℓ =
√
Y¯ ℓ(Y¯ ℓ)† V¯ ℓ; with it we can
write
EyBS = Z
y
B1
(
1
2nχ
∑
ℓ,ℓ′
|ℓ〉B1〈ℓ′| ⊗ V¯ ℓB2S V¯ ℓ
′†
B2S
)
ZyB1 . (6)
Defining the U¯BS =
∑
ℓ P
ℓ
B1
⊗V¯ ℓB2S we can express this in
the more appealing form EyBS = U¯BS(P
ey
B1
⊗ 1B2S)U¯ †BS .
Thus, Bob’s strategy is to untwist the shield as best
he can and then measure his key system in the x-basis.
He and Alice obtain the same outcome with probability
Ps =
1
22nχ
∑
ℓ,ℓ′
B2SE〈ϕ¯ℓ
′ |V¯ ℓ′B2S V¯ ℓ†B2S |ϕℓ〉B2SE . (7)
If Bob can determine y with high probability, Ps ≈ 1,
and U¯ †BS functions as an untwisting operator. Defin-
ing |Ψ′′〉A1BSE = U¯ †BS |Ψ′〉A1BSE , the squared fidelity of
Ψ′′A1B1 with Φ
⊗nχ
A1B1
equals Ps. Then Ps ≥ 1−ǫ2 implies
||Ψ′′A1B1 − Φ⊗nχA1B1 ||1 ≤ 2ǫ [24] and therefore |Ψ′〉A1BSE is
ǫ-private. Altogether we have sketched a proof of
4Theorem 4. There exists a distillation procedure to dis-
till nχ(E) private states from ψ⊗nABS for n→∞.
Note that this is the same rate found by Koashi. Now
the associated method of classical privacy amplification
is simple. The key is the result of measuring Zvj which
commutes with the private state distillation procedure.
This key can just as well be reconstructed from individual
Z measurements directly and inherits privacy from the
virtual procedure.
Theorems 3 and 4 give the secret key rates 1−I(K:E)
and χ(E), corresponding to distillation procedures follow-
ing from the two descriptions of private states, respec-
tively. Since these descriptions are equivalent, we expect
the associated distillation methods to have the same rate.
This intuition can be confirmed either by direct calcula-
tion or by appealing to upper bounds applicable to either
scenario. By the results of [4], χ(E) ≤ 1−I(K:E). Con-
versely, 1−I(K:E) ≤ χ(E) or else by performing the clas-
sical privacy amplification coherently, as detailed in [6],
Bob would effectively be able to distinguish more of the
states ρxBS than possible.
Conclusions.—We have found that the three principle
means of treating privacy amplification are essentially
identical and interchangeable. The dual descriptions of
private states on which the respective distillation meth-
ods rest are shown to be elegantly related by the un-
certainty principle. This provides an immediate and in-
tuitive understanding of how the quantum information
about the key is balanced between the eavesdropper and
shield and how the secret information can be extracted.
Care must be taken to incorporate these results into
QKD security proofs. Here Alice and Bob begin with a
known state |ψ〉ABSE , whereas one of the main tasks of a
key distribution protocol is to reliably estimate the state
shared by the various parties. The presence of a shield
system makes this task more difficult, but recent work
demonstrates how to estimate the parameters relevant
to private state distillation [25].
Reduction of coherent attacks to the case of collective
attacks studied here is similarly intricate. This reduction
has been accomplished by creating a permutation invari-
ant state ϑ
(n)
ABE by randomly scrambling the order of the
quantum signals and then demonstrating that the cho-
sen key distillation method produces just as many secret
bits as from the product input ψ⊗nABE . It remains to be
shown that when including the shield system this sort of
reduction method still applies. In particular, Bob must
still be able to distinguish the ρxBS even though the x are
no longer independently and identically distributed. We
will report on this in a future publication.
Finally, our result on achieving the Holevo bound using
2-universal hashing may be of independent interest.
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Appendix—Given a source described by the ensemble
E = {px, ρx}dx=1 which distributes letters x to Alice and
states ρx to Bob, we seek a protocol which enables Bob
to learn x and consumes few resources as possible. The
idea is for Alice to send Bob some (minimal) amount
of information about x so that he can then perform a
measurement to distinguish between the quantum states
consistent with this information.
2-universal hashing can be used for this purpose. A
family of functions f : X → Y is 2-universal if Pr[f(x) =
f(x′)] ≤ 1/|Y| for all x 6= x′ ∈ X . Note that random
linear hashing, as used in the main text, is 2-universal.
Suppose Alice applies a random f from the hash fam-
ily to a block (length-n string) x of letters, using X =
{0, 1, . . . , d−1}n. Then Bob will be left to distinguish be-
tween the elements of {ρy = ρy1⊗· · ·⊗ρyn | f(y) = f(x)},
for which he uses the measurement {Efy} as defined in
Eq. 4, with the slight change that Ey = 0 when y is
nontypical. This rejects nontypical signals, which are in
any case exceedingly rare. Adapting the presentation in
Appendix B of [26] shows this protocol will have low er-
ror probability. We now specialize to d = 2, but the
argument is essentially the same for the general case.
Given a function f , the average probability of error is
given by PE|f =
∑
x pxTr[ρx(1 − Efx)]. Lemma 2 of [27]
states that 1− (S+T )−1/2S(S+T )−1/2 ≤ 2(1−S)+4T
for 0 ≤ S ≤ 1 and T ≥ 0, which we can apply to Efx
using Λx = ΠΠxΠ as S and
∑
x′ 6=x Λx′ as T to obtain
PE|f ≤ 2− 2
∑
x
px
(
Tr[ρxΛx]− 2
∑
x′ 6=x
f(x)=f(x′)
Tr[ρxΛx′ ]
)
, (8)
where px = px1· · · pxn When x is typical, Tr[ρxΛx] ≥
1− 3ǫ and by construction Λx = 0 when x is not typical.
Moreover, the total probability of typical strings exceeds
1− ǫ, so we obtain
PE|f ≤ 8ǫ+ 4
∑
x
px
∑
x′ 6=x
f(x)=f(x′)
Tr[ρxΛx′ ]. (9)
Now average over the possible f :
PE ≤ 8ǫ+ 4
∑
x
px
∑
x′ 6=x
Pr[f(x′)=f(x)] Tr[ρxΛx′ ]
≤ 8ǫ+ 4|Y|
∑
x
px
∑
x′ 6=x
Tr[ρxΛx′ ]
≤ 8ǫ+ 4|Y|
∑
x,x′
pxTr[ρxΛx′ ]
= 8ǫ+
4
|Y|
∑
x′
Tr[ρ⊗nΛx′ ] (10)
5To evaluate the trace, note that Tr[ρ⊗nΛx′ ] =
Tr[Πρ⊗nΠΛx′ ]. Since Πρ⊗nΠ ≤ 2−n[S(ρ)−δ]Π (Eq. 19
of [26]) we have
PE ≤ 8ǫ+ 42
−n[S(ρ)−δ]
|Y|
∑
x′
Tr[Λx′ ]. (11)
But again Λx′ = 0 for nontypical x
′ while Tr[Λx′] ≤
2n[
P
j
pjS(ρj)+δ] otherwise (Eq. 18), leading to
PE ≤ 8ǫ+ 42
−n[χ(E)−2δ]
|Y|
∑
x∈Typ
1. (12)
Finally, the size of the typical set is less than 2n[H(pi)+δ],
so putting it all together we have
PE ≤ 8ǫ+ 4 2n[H(pi)−χ(E)+3δ]|Y|−1. (13)
By choosing log2 |Y| = n[H(pi)− χ(E) + 4δ], the proba-
bility of error can be made arbitrarily small.
Since Bob ultimately learns x, an information gain
of H(pi) bits, but Alice only provides H(pi)−χ(E), the
quantum states themselves provide on average χ(E) bits,
in accordance with the Holevo bound.
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